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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ANIMALS.
Where the plaintiff, walking along a sidewalk, while
attempting to get out of the way, by going further towards
Horse~ an outer railing, was kicked by a horse of the
Kickiang, defendant, which the defendant's servant was
Viclous leading on the sidewalk, the Supreme Court
Propensilties of New Jersey holds that it was proper to in-
struct that it was not necessary in order to recover, to show
that the defendant knew that the horse was a kicker, since
his use of the walk was wrongful: Healey v. Ballantine &
Sons, 49 Atl. 5ii. The defendant relied -mainly on the
English case, Cox v. Burbige, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 430 in
which it appeared that the defendant's horse being on a
highway unattended, kicked the plaintiff, a child, who was
playing there. There was no evidence to show how the
horse came on the spot, or what induced him to kick the
child, or that he was accustomed to kick, and it was held
that there was no evidence upon which the plaintiff could
go to the jury. In the late New Jersey case the court declines
to follow this ruling, regarding the case as bad law.
BILLS AND NOTE-S.
Where notes were made to be discounted at a bank at
the legal rate, the payment of a portion of the proceeds
Usury of the discount to an accommodation endorser to
compensate him for the endorsement does not make the
notes usurious: N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Third Department) in Birdsall v. Wheeler, 71 N. Y. Supp.
67. Had the person who received this portion of the pro-
ceeds been the lender, says the court, it might properly be
construed as an agreement to pay more than lawful interest,
but not so under the circumstances.
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CARRIBRS.
A. secured a ticket from the defendant company, B., for
transportation from Detroit to Chicago and return over con-
Assumption necting roads. It was represented that the ticket
of Risk by included a berth on a connecting boat, but the
Passenger purser on the boat refused to honor the same,
and A., refusing to pay the price demanded, slept on a couch
in the cabin. Later he brought suit to recover for physical
pain suffered from a cold alleged to have been contracted
from the fact that the cabin door was open all night. The
Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Mewethy v. Detroit, G.
R. & W. R. Co., 86 N. W. 827, that A. had assumed the risk
of sleeping on the couch in the cabin and could not recover.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
The written promise of a married woman, domiciled in
New Jersey, to pay a sum of money to the order of her hus-
Public band, signed by her at her domicile, and car-
Policy ried by him, with her acquiescence, to New
York, and there endorsed, and delivered in exchange for
other notes of like import, is a contract made in the state of
New York; and hence the capacity of the wife to bind her-
self by a contract of suretyship is to be determined by the
law of that state: Thomson v. Taylor (N. J.), 49 Atl. 544.
Such a contract, the Court of Errors and Appeals holds, if
valid in the state of New York, will be enforced against
the married woman in New Jersey, though such contract if
made in the latter state would be void, the majority of the
court deciding that the New Jersey law as to suretyship in
such cases is not a declaration of a public policy that closes
the courts of the state to rights of action arising in other
jurisdictions where the law is different. Three judges dis-
sent.
In Shannon v. Georgia State Building and Loan Associa-
tion, 30 Southern, 51, the Supreme Court of Georgia holds
Building that where a foreign building association loaned
and Loan money to a resident of the state on property
Associations, within the state, and payments of interest were
Contracts made to a local board in the state; though the
contract stipulated that payment was to be made in the
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state of the association's domicile, yet the association, by
establishing local boards within the state, and doing a regu-
lar and continuous business, had domesticated itself within
the state, and its contracts were subj _t to the laws of the
state.
CONNECTING CARRIERS.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi holds in Alabama &
V. Ry. Co. v. Lamkin, 30 Southern, 47, that where two con-
Liability as necting railroads are under one management,
Partners so as to constitute one system, or have contracts
for the carriage of goods, in which the roads are held out
as a line for through transportation, they are jointly liable
as partners for injuries to goods so shipped, though the
general management of each road is retained by the respec-
tive companies. "Wherever there is an identity of interest,
or the companies have placed certain features of their busi-
ness under one general control, although the general man-
agement of each road is retained by its owners, the com-
panies are, as to such features of their business, partners, and
liable as such."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A person has no vested right in a cause of action or de-
fence based solely upon an informality or irregularity in
Vested judicial proceedings, not affecting his substan-
Rights, tial equities; and a retroactive statute curing
flortgage defects in such proceedings which are mere irreg-
Foreclosure ularities and mistakes and do not extend to mat-
ters of jurisdiction is not void as depriving one of his prop-
erty without due process of law. This rule is applied by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the case of Farnsworth
Loan and Realty Co. v. Commonwealth Title Ins. and Trust
Co., 86 N. W. 877, to a case where there had been a failure
to file an affidavit as to costs and disbursements in mortgage
foreclosure proceedings required by a statute. The defect
having been cured by a later statute, the court holds such
later statute constitutional. The Chief Justice and one of
the Associate Justices dissent.
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CONTRACTS.
A contract which has been executed on Sunday, and which
is therefore void, cannot be made valid by ratification on a
Executed on subsequent week-day: Supreme Court of Michi-
Sunday gan in Acme Electrical, Illustrating and Adver-
tising Co. v. Van Derbeck, 86 N. W. 786. Of course, this
rule does not bar recovery on a quanttm reruit, where
part or all of the work contracted for has been performed
and accepted: Bollin v. Hooper, 86 N. W. 795 (same juris-
diction).
In reference to the same question, as to the effect of acts
done on Sunday, the Supreme Court of North Dakota holds
Factor's in Rosen baun v. Haves, 86 N. V. 973, that the
Lien fact that a factor acquired possession of the prop-
erty on Sunday will not defeat his possession or lien based
thereon. A Sunday transfer of property, even when pro-
hibited by law, is effective so far as executed. The law
merely refuses to lend its aid to enforce executory features
of the contract, or to help the parties to regain their former
position.
CONVERSION.
The owner of certificates of indebtedness, which by cus-
tom were negotiable, called on a broker and stated that he
Delivery of wished to leave the certificates in the broker's
certificates keeping. The broker consented, and the owner
in Envelope handed him the certificates, which the broker
placed in an envelope, on which was written the owner's
name and the words "Private Property." The broker then
sealed the envelope and carried it into his safe. Subse-
quently he pledged the certificates for his individual debt,
and they were sold by the pledgee. In trover by the owner
against the purchaser, it being in issue whether the certifi-
cates had been entrusted to the broker, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts held that the facts did not show
such to have been the case, but that it was the sealed envel-
ope containing the certificates which was entrusted, giving
no implied right to break the package and pledge the certifi-
cates so as to confer title on a bona fide purchaser: Scollans
v. Rollins, 6o N. E. 983.
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In Ritchie v. Burke, 1O9 Fed. 16, the United States Cir-
cuit Court (N. D. Ohio) holds that a pledgee of railroad
Registration bonds payable to bearer does not convert such
of Bonds bonds by causing them to be registered in his
by Pledgee own- name, so that they are thereafter payable
only to him or his order, but such action is proper for the
protection of both himself and the pledgor. The reporter
refers, in connection with the case, to a note to Frater v.
Bank, 42 C. C. A. 135, in reference to the rights and liabili-
ties of pledgees of corporate stock.
CORPORATIONS.
In Niles v. New York Cent. and H. R. R. Co., 71 N. Y.
Supp. 271, a minority stockholder sued to recover damages
to his stock sustained by the defendants' alleged
Action by tort in forcing the foreclosure of a mortgage
'linority on the property of his corporation with the con-
Stockholder sent of a majority of the stockholders to the
end that the defendants might gain the control of the prop-
erty. The foreclosure practically destroyed the value of the
plaintiff's stock, but the New York Supreme Court (Special
Term, New York County) holds that the action is not
maintainable, on the ground that such injury is common to
all the stockholders.
It re Ervin, lO9 Fed. 135, the United States District
Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania) holds that where
Bankruptcy a corporation entered into partnership articles
of Partner with a firm, and embarked moneys in and sold
goods to the firm, the corporation, to the extent of such acts,
executed the articles of partnership by becoming a partner
de facto, and could not, by asserting that the partnership
agreement was ultra vires, prove a claim in competition with
general creditors upon the bankruptcy of the firm.
DAMAGES.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds in Williams v. Underhill, 71 N. Y.
flental Supp. 291, that a recovery for mental injuries
Injuries and suffering alone is not precluded in cases of
wilful tort. The court distinguishes the cases which refuse
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to allow a recovery where such damages are all that can be
shown to have resulted where the action is based on the
negligence of the defendant, on the ground that in such
cases the mental injuries are not regarded as the natural and
probable consequences of the negligent act, and that this
reason fails in cases of wilful tort.
DANGEROUS PREMISES.
An employer is not bound by the act of his employe, "not
his alter ego," in inviting or permitting children to be on his
Invitation of premises: Supreme Court of Michigan in For-
Employe imall v. Standard Oil Co., 86 N. W. 946. Nor
will tacit acquiescence on the part of an employer in permit-
ting children upon his premises, be sufficient to fasten lia-
bility for injuries caused by negligent conditions thereon.
In Kent v. Halliday, 49 Ati. 700, it appeared that the
plaintiff alleged that he purchased Paris green of the de-
Remoteness fendants, to kill potato bugs, and that because
of the impure and weak character of the article,
it failed to kill them, and that by reason of such failure the
plaintiff's crop was ruined. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island holds that the damages are not so remote and indefi-
nite as to render a declaration based thereon demurrable.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
The statute law of Rhode Island, similar to that of most
of the states of the Union, provides that wherever death shall
Unbor result from a wrongful act the next of kin may
Child maintain an action therefor, if the negligence
was such that the deceased could have maintained an action
had he survived. In Gorman v. Budlong, 49 Atl. 704, the
Supreme Court of the state holds that where a mother was
injured through the negligence of the defendant so that she
gave premature birth to a child, which died as a result of the
premature delivery, the statute did not entitle the child's
father to maintain an action, as the next of kin of its wrong-
ful death.
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9I ECTION OF REMEDIES.
In Baltimore and Ohio S. W. R. Co. v. Adams, 6o N. E,'
OO4, the Appellate Court of Indiana holds that where a
CQflde~nma- person contracting to sell a right of way to a
tion: Efec railroad company refuses to perform, a condem-
nation of the right of way does not prev.ent- thf company-
from maintaining an action for damages for breach of'coi-
tract.
SSTATRS.
Against the dissent of three justices the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts holds in Powow River Nat. Bank v.
Claims, Abbott, 6o N E, 973, that where the plaintiffs
Delay, had claims against an estate, and relying on the
ntstpke statements of the administrator thai the estate
would be represented insolvent in such time as to give them
amnple opportunity to present their claims to the commis-
sioners, and that it would waste the assets to bring suit,
refrained from doing so, and the commissioners were ap-
pointed so late that the plaintiffs were unable to present
their claims until after the expiration of the period allowed
by statute for the presentation of claims, there was no mis-
take such as to entitle them to equitable relief permitting,
them to share with the other creditors.
FOREIGN ADMINISTRATOR.
A savings bank paid a deposit therein to a foreign admin-
istrator of a deceased depositor upon his production of a
]Payment of certified copy of his letters. A domestic admin-
Deposit istrator of the depositor had been appointed in
the same county five months before the foreign administra-
tor's appointment. Under these facts the City Court of New
York (General Term) holds in Maas v. German Savings
Bank, 7 N. Y. Supp. 483, that the presentation of the
foreign letters put the bank on inquiry as to the appoint-
ment of a domestic administrator in its county, and such
payment to the foreign administrator was no protection
against the claim of the domestic administrator.
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FOREIGN DIVORCE.
In Starbuck v. Starbuck, 71 N. Y. Supp. 104, it appeared
that the plaintiff sought to recover dower to the estate of
her deceased husband. She had been a resident
Dower, Bar of Massachusetts and married a resident of New
York. She later returned to Massachusetts and instituted
proceedings for a divorce on the ground of cruelty. The
husband was served personally in New York and the divorce
decreed. On the strength of the decree thus obtained by the
wife, he remarried. The New York Supreme Court (Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department) holds that the Massa-
chusetts decree is not binding on the plaintiff in New York,
though obtained by proceedings prosecuted by her, and that
hence it did not bar her right to dower in her husband's
lands in New York. The fact that her husband remarried
on the strength of the divorce obtained by her does not stop
her from claiming such dower. Goodrich, P. J., dissents.
FRAUD.
A circle of King's Daughters was induced to support a
certain woman during several years by her fraudulent pre-
tense that she was destitute, when in fact she
support had a considerable estate in bank. The com-
plainants, after her death, brought a bill in equity for relief.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey holds in An-
derson v. Eggers, 49 Atl. 578, that the complainants were
entitled to be recompensed out of the estate for the money
and property so furnished to her; and further that in view
of the numerous small items to be considered in ascertaining
the compensation due, the jurisdiction in equity should be
sustained.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
A wife, with the knowledge and approval of her husband,
to secure a present loan, mortgaged property which she held
in trust for him. This trust arose upon a con-Trust
Property, veyance by the husband to the wife. The mort-
Notice of gagee knew the circumstances under which the
Fraud trust arose, but so far as appeared, he did not
know of any intent on the husband's part to defraud his
creditors thereby nor of circumstances from which that
intent could be inferred. Under these circumstances the
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Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds in Lewis v. Dud-
ley, 49 Atl. 572, that the mortgagee was an innocent pur-
chaser for value, and took a good title under his mortgage,
though her title may have been fraudulent.
HOMICIDE.
Where, in a murder trial, the court did not define a "rea-
sonable doubt" in its charge it is error to refuse such a
Reasonable charge when offered by the defendant: Terrell
Doubt v. State, 64 S. W. 223 (Supreme Court of
Arkansas).
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
A husband's right to damages from a man who debauches
his wife is not precluded by the fact that his wife was equally
Debauchery guilty in making improper advances: Supreme
of Wife Court of Pennsylvania in Seiber v. Pettitt, 49
Atl. 763. Such fact, however, is proper in mitigation of
damages, since the court says: "Less money may indemnify
him for the loss of such a wife's affection and society, and a
milder penalty may suffice to punish such a degree of guilt
on the part of the man, but the essence of the action-a
wrong and injury to an innocent husband-remains," and
hence the cause of action is not lost by these facts.
INSURANCE.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in
Campbell v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs,
Suicide 49 Atl. 55 o , meets the old question of the effect
of suicide upon a life insurance policy and holds,
against the dissent of six justices, that suicide will not de-
feat recovery upon a contract of life insurance not procured
by the insured with the intention of committing suicide,
unless the contract so provides in express terms.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
The general rule of law that, "when a tenant with the
consent of the landlord, express or implied, holds over his
Holding term, the law implies a continuation of the orig-
Over inal tenancy upon the same terms and condi-
tions," does not obtain in a case where the rent reserved in
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the original lease for the most part consists of the per-
formance by the tenant of labor upon the premises of such
a nature that, being once performed during the original
term, becomes incapable of further performance by the
tenant while holding over: Supreme Court of Kansas in
Martin v. Hamersky, 65 Poc. 637.
In Young v. Consolidated Imp. Co., 65 Pac. 720, it ap-
peared that a lease provided that the tenant could put up such
Improvements additional improvements as it (a company)
might consider advisable, and remove the same
at the expiration of the lease. Later it was mutually agreed
that the lease should be extended, with the right in the lessee
to occupy the premises from month to month, each party to
give a reasonable notice of a desire to terminate the tenancy.
The Supreme Court of Utah holds that the extension of the
terms and conditions of the lease included the right of the
lessee to remove improvements placed there by it. The case
presents a different aspect from the well known state of
facts arising where a new lease is accepted which fails to refer
to the improvements.
LIFE TENANT.
"Ordinarily," says the Supreme Court of Nebraska in
Schimpf v. Rhodenald, 86 N. W. 908, "a life tenant who
Improvemen makes betterments upon the estate is not en-
titled to be reimbursed for the same by the rever-
sioners or out of the reversion." But, it is held, even in
case he should be so entitled, his right will not pass by his
will purporting to devise the lands in fee; and the occupying
claimant's act will not in such case be available to the devisee
with respect to the betterments made before the termination
of the life estate.
LIMITATIONS.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds in Brintnall v. Rice, 71 N. Y. Supp. 441,
New Promise, that where A. made an accommodation note to
Sufficiency enable B. to obtain a loan, and pledged certain
personal property to secure such note, subsequently paying
a portion of it to regain possession of the pledged property,
a letter of B., saying that he would see that A. should be at
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no loss in the transaction, was a sufficient acknowledgment
of indebtedness and a promise to pay to prevent the running
of the statute of limitations. Two judges dissent on the
ground that the writing does not contain such a distinct and
unequivocal promise to pay the debt as the law requires.
TENANTS IN COMMON.
In Polk v. Gunther, 64 S. W. 25 the Supreme Court of
Tennessee holds that where one tenant in common, at his
Improvements own expense, improves the common property,
and afterwards partition in kind is made, such
improvements should be alloted to the party making them,
without any charge for their value.
VENDOR'S LIEN.
In a proceeding to enforce a vendor's lien on certain
described land, it appeared that the sale was not only of
Purchase the land on which the lien was claimed, but also
Price of certain timber on other land, and that no
value had been placed upon the timber. The Supreme Court
of Michigaf holds that, as it was impossible to state the
amount of the purchase price of the land, no lien therefor
could exist: Warner v. Bliven, 87 N. W. 49.
WATER COURSES.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds in Kray v. Mug-
gli, 86 N. W. 882, that where the flow of a stream of water
Obstruction, has been diverted from its natural channel, or
Prescriptive obstructed by a permanent dam, and such diver-
Rights sion or obstruction has continued for the time
necessary to establish a prescriptive right to perpetually main-
tain the same, the riparian owners along such stream of
water, who have improved their property with reference to
the change and in reliance on the continuance thereof, ac-
qire a reciprocal right to have the artificial condition remain
undisturbed, and the person who placed the obstruction in
the stream, or caused the diversion of the waters, and all
those claiming under or through him, are estopped upon
principles of equity from restoring the waters to their natural
channel or state to the injury of such riparian owners. Chief
Justice Start dissents, but writes no individual opinion.
